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A CHAMPIONSHIP SEASON FOR THE FIRST

AMENDMENT
Leon Lazer:

Okay, we are about to start. Everyone please be seated. This
afternoon we have one of our regulars to speak to us on the First
Amendment. Professor Joel Gora from Brooklyn Law School has
always been one of our star participants in this program. He is a
very well respected authority on the First Amendment. Apart
from being a professor at Brooklyn Law School, he is also the
Associate Dean of that institution, a former staff counsel of the
American Civil Liberties Union, co-author of a book, The Right
To Protest.1 Without further ado, Professor Joel Gora.
ProfessorJoel Gora:*
INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Judge Lazer. It is a pleasure to be here. I missed
the program last year. I was not able to attend or participate. In
my absence, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the First
Amendment2 seven out of eight times. My initial reaction was
that maybe I should stay away more often, but I enjoy the
program very much, and so I could not resist accepting Judge
Lazer's kind invitation for a return engagement. In this season of
playoff games and wild card slots, let me give you some
statistics. Last year, the First Amendment had a .875 batting
average in the Supreme Court. Individual justices also did quite
well. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia hit .625.
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Thomas, O'Connor and Stevens hit
.750. Justice Souter batted an impressive .875 ruling against the
1. JOEL M. GORA ET AL., THE RIGHT TO PROTEST (1991).

2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press: or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." Id.
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First Amendment claimant only once and Justice Kennedy, whom
I have previously described at this podium as Mr. First
Amendment, went eight for eight, batting a perfect 1,000. Justice
O'Connor wrote opinions in five of the eight cases. 3 She was the
most prolific First Amendment scholar. The new kid on the
block, Justice Breyer, authored no opinion in any of these eight
cases, still learning the ropes.
This was also a year when deuces were wild. There were lots
of things happening in twos. Two cases dealt with classic First
Amendment chestnuts, the right of public workers to speak off
duty, 4 and the right of someone to hand out a leaflet without
putting her name on it. 5 Two of the cases dealt with commercial
speech issues. The first case addressed whether Coors Beer could
place alcohol content on the label, 6 and the second case addressed
whether lawyers could send soliciting letters to accident or injury
victims within thirty days of the accident. 7 Two cases dealt with
more subtle issues of when private entities can be subject to
public accountability in deciding which speakers can use their

3. See Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510,
2525 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Capitol Square Review v. Pinette,
115 S. Ct. 2440, 2451 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371
(1995); United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct.
1003, 1019 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961,
975 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
4. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. at 1003 (holding that a
ban which prohibits a government employee from accepting honorariums for
speaking and other off-duty activities violates the First Amendment).
5. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995) (holding
that an Ohio statute which prohibits the distribution of anonymous campaign
literature violates the First Amendment).
6. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995) (holding that a
federal act which prohibits the display of alcohol content on beer labels
violates the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech).
7. FloridaBar, 115 S. Ct. 2371 (holding that the Florida Bar rules which
prohibits personal injury lawyers from sending targeted direct mail solicitations
to victims and their relatives for thirty days following an accident violates the
First and Fourteenth Amendments).
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facilities. 8 In one case, the Court held that Amtrak was not a

private entity, but a public agency, subject to First Amendment
scrutiny when it decides to reject advertising at Penn Station on
political grounds. 9 In another case, the Court ruled that a St.
Patrick's Day Parade is a private event, not a public
accommodation, and therefore the sponsor can choose what
groups to admit and what groups to exclude. 10 Lastly, two cases
explored the delicate balance that must be struck between church
and state, between what is permitted, and indeed required, by the
Free Speech 11 and Free Exercise Clauses 12 of the First
Amendment, versus what is prohibited by the Establishment
Clause 13 of the First Amendment. In one difficult case, the Court
ruled that student religious groups can use student activity funds
to run a religious campus newspaper. 14 In the other case, the
Court ruled that a religious symbol, a cross, could be placed on
public space by an irreligious group, the Ku Klux Klan, without
violating the Establishment Clause. 15 Finally, concerning these

various cases, two invalidated acts of Congress on First
Amendment grounds, 16 and two involved Coors Beer, 17 making

8. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,
115 S.Ct. 2338 (1995); Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S.Ct.
961 (1995).
9. Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 961.
10. Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2338.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech Clause states in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech .... " Id.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause states: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof .... " Id. (emphasis added).
13. U.S. CONST. amend I. The Establishment Clause states in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion. . .

."

Id.

14. Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Virginia., 115 S.Ct. 2510 (1995).
15. Capitol Square Review v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
16. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003
(1995); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Corp., 115 S.Ct. 1585 (1995).
17. Rubin, 115 S.Ct. at 1585; Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.,
115 S. Ct. at 961.
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this, of course, the first term that the Court has had two cases of

Coors.
The church state cases, though difficult and dividing the Court,
signaled some of the most powerful themes that I feel pervaded
last term's First Amendment cases. The themes can be summed
up in two words: autonomy and neutrality. Speakers' autonomy
and government's neutrality. Speakers have the right to choose
what to say and the government's job is to stay out of the way. I
am reminded of the famous story about Diogenes the Cynic who
was asked by Alexander the Great if he could help him in any
way. "Yes," replied Diogenes, "get out of my light."' 18 Well, the
Court seemed to be using the First Amendment to tell the
government to get out of the people's light. If the old saw that
"the Court follows the election returns" has any credence, then
the thrust of the Newtonian Revolution last fall-that's Gingrich,
not Sir Isaac-is mirrored in the Court's distrust of government.
The concept is that government is best which governs least. Of
course, in many respects, those themes animate the First
Amendment itself, and so the themes of speaker autonomy and
government neutrality can be felt in many of the cases that I am
now about to discuss.
Themes were played out in several motifs. Government cannot
tell speakers what to say and how to say it. Nor can government
use its power over resources to control speakers who use those
resources: where government has set aside its funds, facilities
and forums for speech, it cannot broadly control the way
speakers use those opportunities. Rather, government's basic
obligation is neutrality and "hands off' freedom of speech, press,
and religion. Finally, that required neutrality does not constitute
complicity or endorsement or ratification of the speech, press, or
religious activity that the government is allowing or permitting.
This is especially true in the two religion cases where the Court
ruled that honoring free speech and free exercise claims does not
constitute establishing religious support, thereby reflecting the
18. JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs 86 (15th ed. 1980) (citation
omitted). When asked by Alexander if he wanted anything, Diogenes replied,
"stand a little out of my sun." Id.
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Court's willingness to require greater accommodation of religious
use of forums and facilities.
Let us now see how those themes played out in the specific
cases.

I. UNITED STATES v. NATIONAL TREASURY
EMPLOYEES UNION
First, let me talk about those two old chestnuts, the off duty
rights of public employees and the free speech rights of lonely
pamphleteers. In United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union, 19 Justice Stevens wrote the first of his two powerful First
Amendment opinions of the term. 20 I am always thankul for the
Supreme Court custom that permits the most senior Justice in the
majority to assign the opinion in cases where the Chief Justice is
in the dissent. And so, Justice Stevens assigned himself to the
opinion in this case, and wrote a very strong First Amendment
opinion, as he did in the next case as well.
A century ago, Justice Holmes wrote that a policeman may
have a right to talk politics, but he does not have a right to be a
policeman, and can be fired for talking politics. 2 1 Our First
Amendment doctrine has improved somewhat in the century since
then. The issue in the National Treasury Employees Union case
was, if a policeman gives a speech about politics or poetry to the
PBA, or any other outside group, can the government prohibit
the policeman from getting paid for that speech?22 Put another

way, is moonlighting by public employees and officials protected

19. 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
20. Justice Stevens also wrote the opinion for McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
21. McAulliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892)
("[A policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman.").
22. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. at 1008. The
respondents are not literally policemen, but are "[t]wo unions and several
career civil servants" employed by the federal government. Id. at 1010.

346

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 12

by the First Amendment? Congress said no, but the Supreme
23
Court ruled that it was protected.
The case is also an interesting object lesson in the difficulties of
legislative drafting. Congress had a perfectly sensible objective in
mind: to try to keep high level federal officials from being subtly
wooed or influenced at all by business and private interests who
might give fat honorariums for five minute speeches to trade
conventions.24 Somehow the task of translating that perfectly
sensible concept into acceptable legislative language and policy
proved insurmountable.
The ban on receiving honorariums for speeches, articles, or
outside activities, was enacted in 1989, and it provided that no
federal official or employee of any branch or at any level could
receive any honorariums, i.e., any compensation for an
appearance, speech or article. 25 That seemed to be doubly
problematic. It covered all officials and employees, high or low,
from cabinet secretaries to letter carriers, and it applied to
speeches, writings, or outside activities on all kinds of topics and
in all kinds of settings, whether or not it related to the person's
nine-to-five federal responsibilities. 26 Under complaints that this
was too broad, Congress enacted an amendment two years later
exempting certain activities from the ban of honoraria. Any series
23. Id. at 1018. The Court held that "the speculative benefits the honoraria
ban may provide the Government are not sufficient to justify this crudely
crafted burden on respondents' freedom to engage in expressive activities." Id.
24. See id. at 1009 ("[Miany members of Congress are supplementing
their official compensation by accepting . . . 'honoraria' for meeting with
interest groups which desire to influence their votes .... [T]he practice of
accepting honoraria also exteiids to top officials of the Executive and Judicial
Branches.") (quoting FAIRNESS FOR OUR PUBLIC
1989 COMMISSION ON EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE

SERVANTS: REPORT OF THE
AND JUDICIAL SALARIES VI

(1988)).
25. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat.
1760 (1989) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 7 §§ 501-05 (1995)).
26. See National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. at 1009. The
honoraria ban "define[s] 'officer or employee' to include nearly all employees
of the Federal Government. . . ." Id. In addition, "[t]he 1989 Act defined
'honorarium' to encompass any compensation paid to a Government employee
for 'an appearance, speech or article.'" Id. (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
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of appearances, speeches, or articles that were unrelated to an
employee's official duties were excluded. 27 Therefore, one could
lecture in a course if it did not have anything to do with what you
did in the daytime, otherwise, the honorarium ban still applied.
Although by administrative regulation, it was narrowed further so
that you could, for example, sing, act, dance or teach a course.
Those were permitted activities, but giving a speech to a trade
association was a prohibited activity.
The very fact that the law wound up being a hodgepodge was
one of the reasons why I think that it was thrown out. The ban
was challenged by mid-level federal executive employees who
had very wholesome outside moonlighting activities: a postal
employee who lectured on Quakers, a NASA engineer who
lectured on black history, and an IRS auditor who wrote articles
about the environment. 28 In addition, it permitted Justice Stevens
to point out that the honorarium ban might have dried up the
creative juices of such famous federal employees as Nathaniel
29
Hawthorne, Herman Melville, Walt Whitman and Bret Harte.
Obviously, a law which would do that is not long for this world,
and the Supreme Court, by a six to three vote, so held, applying
a number of the relatively settled principles in this new context.
The first principle is that an employee's speech on the job or
related to job matters can be subject to greater regulation than the
speech of a private citizen on those same topics. 30 However,
when an employee speaks on public issues, the employee's
speech as a citizen, and not as an employee, is entitled to greater
First Amendment protection. 3 1 Here, the government, rather than
27. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 102-90, §§ 314(b),
§ 505(3), 105 Stat. 469 (1991) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 7
§ 505(3) (1995) states: "Section 505(3) of the Ethics in Government Act of
1978 is amended by inserting '(including a series of appearances, speeches, or
articles if the subject matter is directly related to the individual's official duties
or the payment is made because of the individual's status with the
Government)' before 'by a Member.'" Id.
28. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. at 1010-11.
29. Id. at 1012.
30. Id.
31. Id. The Court stated that "Congress may impose restraints on the jobrelated speech of public employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if
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punishing a single instance of misconduct by one employee,
passed a ban that prohibited all employees from speaking on all
topics in virtually all circumstances. The Supreme Court felt that
this law did not properly adjust the balance between employee's
32
speech and the needs of the government as an employer.
The Court determined that whatever concerns with propriety or
the appearance of impropriety exist when government workers or
federal officials give speeches and receive fees for those
speeches, the government could not attempt to deal with that
problem through such an overbroad approach as a ban of this
kind on honorarium. 33 The only problem the majority found was
a question of remedy. 34 Should the ban be struck down in all of
its applications or only those circumstances where there was a
"nexus" or a connection between the speech, the article, or the
venue in which it was given, and the person's job? 35 The
government suggested that the Court should draft a nexus
exception or connectedness exception onto the statute. 3 6 The
Court stated that it would really be doing Congress' work, and
they were not prepared to do that, therefore, the Court basically
invalidated the ban on its face in its application to all employees
below the range of GS-16. 37
In this case, there were three and one-half dissents. Justice
O'Connor agreed with invalidating the ban where there is no
nexus to one's official status, but would have upheld it where
there was a connection. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas, felt the Court had slighted the
applied to the public at large." Id. However, "the Government bears the
burden of justifying [an] adverse employment action" when the speech of
public employees involves public concern. Id.
32. Id. at 1013.

33. Id. at 1016. The Court saw little harm resulting from a federal
employee "accepting pay to lecture on the Quaker religion or to write dance
reviews." Id.

34. Id. at 1019. The Court affirmed the granting of an injunction against
the enforcement of the honorarium ban, but only against the parties before the
Court.
35.
36.
37.

d.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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government's concerns, inflated the ban's impact on just a few
employees, and improperly ignored the long-standing judicial
approval of efforts to combat impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety by federal officials.
In a way, the case is a bit of payback for a 1994 decision,
Waters v. Churchill,3 8 where the Court seemed to take a more
restricted view of workplace speech by public employees. The
majority, in the National Treasury Employees Union case, tended
to come from the dissenters in the Churchill case, which was
opposite in its approach. 39 The Treasury Employees Court left
open the question of whether an honorarium ban on speeches that
relate to one's job, where there is a nexus or a connection
between the fee one receives and the work one does on the
government's payroll, is a permissible restriction. 40 The Court
did not have to resolve this because the restriction here was not
so limited. 4 1 So chalk one up for the free speech rights of public
employees to engage in a wide variety of moonlighting.
H. McINTYRE v. OHIO ELECTIONS COMMISSION
The other more traditional kind of First Amendment case
involved another indirect but potent restraint on speech. In the
honorarium case, the restraint was that one could give a speech,
but one could not get any money for it, and the Court rightly
assumed that this would discourage people from giving a speech.
38. 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994) (holding that a public employer may dismiss a
public worker for speech provided that the employer reasonably believes that
the speech is unprotected).

39. See id. at 1898 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The First
Amendment... demands that the Government respects its employees'
freedom to express their opinions on issues of public importance.").
40. NationalTreasury Employees Union, 115 S. CE. at 1018-19. The Court

stated that "tihe process of drawing a proper nexus... would likely raise
independent constitutional concerns whose adjudication is unnecessary to
decide this case." Id. at 1019.
41. Id. at 1012 ("Neither the character of the authors, the subject matter of
their expression, the effect of the content of their expression on their official
duties, nor the kind of audiences they address has any relevance to
[respondent's] employment.").
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In the McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission42 case, the
restriction on speech was that one must put one's name on a
leaflet being handed out. 43 It really did involve a lonely
anonymous pamphleteer, a sort of a staple of First Amendment
lore. A woman named Margaret McIntyre handed out flyers to
people as they were entering a school board meeting opposing a
new additional tax for school activities. 44 It was a very simple

flyer. It just encouraged people to vote against the tax and it was
signed, "Concerned Parents and Taxpayers." 45 There was not a
whiff of false, misleading or defamatory fact or opinion. There

was no mudslinging and no character assassination. It was just a
statement of her opinion. 4 6 A school official came over to her
42. 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995) (considering whether an Ohio statute
prohibiting the distribution of unsigned campaign literature is violative of the
First Amendment right to free speech).
43. Id. at 1514-15.
44. Id. at 1514.
45. Id.

46. The text of Mrs. McIntyre's leaflet was as follows:
VOTE NO

ISSUE 19 SCHOOL TAX LEVY
Last election Westerville Schools, asked us to vote yes for new
buildings and expansions programs. We gave them what they asked. We
knew there was crowded conditions and new growth in the district.
Now we find out there is a 4 million dollar deficit - WHY?
We are told the 3 middle schools must be split because of overcrowding, and yet we are told 3 schools are being closed-WHY?
A magnet school is not a full operating school, but a specials school.
Residents were asked to work on a 20 member commission to help
formulate the new boundafies. For 4 weeks they worked long and hard
and came up with a very workable plan. Their plan was totally
disregarded-WHY?
WASTE of tax payers dollars must be stopped. Our children's education
and welfare must come first. WASTE CAN NO LONGER BE
TOLERATED,
PLEASE VOTE NO
ISSUE 19
THANK YOU.
CONCERNED PARENTS
AND
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and said, in effect, "it's illegal to hand out unsigned leaflets," but
she continued to hand them out.47

A few months later, after the tax proposal was finally passed,
and after being defeated a few times by the voters, the same

official that had not liked Mrs. McIntyre's position in the first
instance, filed a complaint against her with the Ohio Elections
Commission. 4 8 She was charged with handing out unsigned

leaflets. 4 9 Indeed, almost every state, Ohio included, has a
broadly worded law that outlaws anonymous political leaflets and
requires that all political leaflets, pamphlets, flyers and the like,
must state names and addresses for the group or person
responsible for them. 50 The election board found that Mrs.
McIntyre violated the ban by handing out leaflets without her
name on them, and fined her one hundred dollars. 5 1 The Ohio

courts upheld that position on the grounds that Ohio had an
interest in voter protection, and that electoral purity outweighed
the minor burden on the speaker's rights of having to put a name
52
on the pamphlet.

TAX PAYERS

Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Oio REv. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (1988) provides:
No person shall write, print, post or distribute, or cause to be written,
printed, posted or distributed, a notice, placard, dodger, advertisement,
sample ballot, or any other form of general publication which is
designed to promote the nomination or election or defeat of a candidate,
or to promote the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence the
voters in any election, or make an expenditure for the purpose of
financing political communications through newspapers, magazines,
outdoor advertising facilities, direct mailings, or other similar types of
general public political advertising, or through flyers, handbills, or
other nonperiodical printed matter, unless there appears on such form of
publication in a conspicuous place or is contained within said statement
the name and residence or business address of the chairman, treasurer,
or secretary of the organization issuing the same, or the person who
issues, makes, or is responsible therefor.
Id.at 1514-15.
51. Id.at 1514.
52. Id.at 1515.
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Mrs. McIntyre died pending the appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court seemed to be so interested in this case that it
allowed her husband to be substituted as her executor and litigant
in the Supreme Court in order to continue the challenge of the
one hundred dollar fine. 53 And, indeed, by a seven to two vote,
the Court reversed the fine and held that the First Amendment
protects the distribution of anonymous political campaign
literature against being subject to an across-the-board ban on such
leaflets. 54 In making this ruling, Justice Stevens, again in a very
powerful First Amendment decision, pointed to the important
historic role that anonymous leaflets and pamphlets played in
American history from the federalist papers 55 to the writings of
Mark Twain under a pseudonym, 5 6 to the leaflet handed out by
Margaret McIntyre. 57 The Court found, "a respected tradition of
anonymity in the advocacy of political causes." 58 And indeed,
Justice Stevens pointed out that the very secret ballot itself, the
cornerstone of American democracy, is the embodiment of the
right of political anonymity. 59 That being so, Ohio could not
justify intruding upon that traditional historic right of political
anonymity by claiming that the law was like a regulation of the
ballot or the area around an election booth. 60 This was not a case
of ballot or electoral mechanics, rather, it was a case of core
political speech being subject to government regulation.
Therefore, what happens in this situation is that it is not an
election case anymore, but a First Amendment case, and exacting
scrutiny is required. The Court found that the exacting scrutiny
test could not be met by this legislation. 6 1 Whatever interests
53. Id. at 1516.

54. Id. at 1524 (holding that pursuant to the Court's interpretation of the
First Amendment, the practice of "anonymous pamphleteering is not a
pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of
dissent.").
55. Id. at 1517 n.6.
56. Id. at 1516 n.4.
57. Id. at 1514.
58. Id. at 1517.
59. Id.

60. Id. at 1518.
61. Id. at 1519.
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there were in disclosing campaign funding or combating fraud,
libel, or corruption, could be dealt with by laws directly
regulating those matters, rather than laws requiring every speaker
to put his or her name on pamphlets that are handed out. Indeed,
in concluding, Justice Stevens pointed out that anonymous
pamphleteering and anonymity, generally, "is a shield from the
tyranny of the majority." 62
It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of
the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular

individuals from retaliation-and their ideas from suppression at
the hand of an intolerant society. The right to remain anonymous

may be abused when it shields fraudulent conduct. But political
speech by its nature will sometimes have unpalatable
consequences, and in general, our society accords greater weight
to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse. 63
Thus, here too, the Court found that the law had dealt with a
difficult and sensitive issue in much too broad and sweeping a
fashion.
There are one or two other interesting points about this
decision. Justice Stevens relied partly on history, but in addition,
on the values of the First Amendment and the important role of
political anonymity in contributing to the values of the First
Amendment. 64 Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in
which he sharply disagreed with the latter tack. 65 In his view, it
was entirely too subjective to determine that the values of the
66
First Amendment required protection for political anonymity.
One looked to history to see what the framers in 1791 of the Bill
of Rights thought about the issues. 67 He surveyed history quite
exhaustively and concluded that yes, indeed, the right to speak
one's mind anonymously about political matters was a central
feature of the political culture of 1791.68 Therefore, it was
62. Id. at 1524.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1516.

65. Id. at 1525 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1530.
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properly recognized as an essential element of protecting the First
Amendment. This was not because of values concerning the First
Amendment, but because of the understanding of it by those who
wrote it. It is a good example of Justice Thomas' interest in
originalism, or looking at how the Constitution would have been
read by the people who wrote these provisions two centuries ago.
For himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia agreed
with Justice Thomas that there was a strong belief in and practice
of anonymous political speech by the Framers, but that the almost
universal political practice and tradition since then has been to
uphold bans on anonymous political speech. 6 9 In a particularly
troublesome application of his search for traditions as a guide to
constitutional interpretation, Justice Scalia concluded that, since
anonymity is not of the essence of the First Amendment, the deep
popular tradition of outlawing anonymous political speech and
requiring disclosure of the identity of the speaker trumps First
Amendment concerns. 70 Finally, in his view, cases that protect
political anonymity are exceptions designed to guard against
harassment of identifiable unpopular speakers and groups and not
1
general application of a right of anonymous speech. 7
In terms of its impact on future cases, the McIntyre case is a
sweeping and extravagant First Amendment opinion that will play
an interesting role in whatever efforts political and lobbying
reform legislation will take in Congress, or on the state or local
level. This is because it is a strong reaffirmation of the right to
engage in political discourse without having to put your name on
it. However, much of the efforts to pass political and legislative
reform bills are efforts to bring greater disclosure and a greater
identification of speakers, supporters, and contributors into the
process. The McIntyre case may put restraints on the ability to
pass some reform measures.

69. Id. at 1531-34.
70. Id. at 1534.
71. Id.

1996]

355

FIRST AMENDMENT35

Il. RUB1N v. COORS BREWING COMPANY
The next two cases that I will discuss are commercial speech
cases. In one case, the speaker wanted to say more than the
government wanted it to. The government tried to restrict what
could be said and the Supreme Court stated that the restriction
was impermissible. 72 Coors wanted to put "alcohol content" on
its labels on beer and in its advertising. However, there is an Act
of Congress dating back to 1935 which prohibits this type of
labeling. 73 The Supreme Court held that in the application of
commercial speech doctrine, a ban on truthful, lawful
information, such as the alcohol content of beer, although aimed
at achieving an important or substantial governmental purpose,
which was to deter the consumption of beer and alcoholism
generally, did not directly advance that purpose. 74 Thus, in
applying the balancing test that is used in the commercial speech
area, the Supreme Court felt there was an imbalance. A ban of

72. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).

73. See 27 U.S.C.A. § 205(e)(2) (West Supp. 1995). Section 205(e)(2)
provides in relevant part that labels of alcoholic beverages:
will provide the consumer with adequate information as to the identity
and quality of the products, the alcoholic content thereof (except that
statements of, or statements likely to be considered as statements of,
alcoholic content of malt beverages are prohibited unless required by
State law and except that, in case of wines, statements of alcoholic
content shall be required only for wines containing more than 14 per
cent of alcohol by volume), the net contents of the package, and the
manufacturer or bottler or importer of the product.
Id.
74. Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1593. The Court stated that the "Government here
has a significant interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens by preventing brewers from competing on the basis of alcohol
strength, which could lead to greater alcoholism and its attendant social costs."
Id. at 1591. However, the Government offered no "convincing evidence that
the labeling ban has inhibited [brewers from competing on the basis of alcohol]
strength ... ." Id. at 1593. The Court found that less restrictive alternatives
than a labeling ban are available, including "directly limiting the alcoholic
content of beers, prohibiting marketing efforts emphasizing high alcohol
strength... [and] limiting the labeling ban only to malt liquors ...

"Id.

356

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 12

the statement on the labels of the alcohol content of beer could
75
not pass First Amendment muster.
I believe that the beer content case has two interesting
ramifications. First, the government claimed that it has much
broader leeway to regulate speech which promotes "socially
harmful activities," such as alcohol, and, indeed, the government
claimed that the commercial speech doctrine really should not
even apply where the speech is about socially harmful
activities. 7 6 Justice Thomas, for the Court, wrote a rather
powerful footnote in which he rejected that argument,
distinguishing two cases which allowed more regulation of
certain forms of commercial speech. 77 Justice Thomas, in effect,
stated that harmful products are not First Amendment
stepchildren.
The sound of rushing air you heard was Joe Camel breathing
an audible sigh of relief. That footnote seems to speak directly to
the question of whether, because of the socially harmful effects of
cigarette smoking, and particularly on young people, the
government somehow has greater leeway to regulate the
advertising of cigarettes on the ground that it is socially harmful,
though lawfully available. The Coors Beer case seems to suggest
otherwise.
IV. FLORIDA BAR v. WENT FOR IT,INC.
The other commercial speech case this past term was one close
to home in that it involved written solicitation of clients by
lawyers. 78 The Court was divided sharply five to four, and
75. Id. at 1594.

76. Id. at 1590-91.
77. Id. at 1589 n.2. The two cases, both involving the advertising of
gambling, distinguished by Justice Thomas are: United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (upholding a federal statute
prohibiting radio broadcasts of lottery advertising by a broadcaster located in a
state that does not allow lotteries); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism

Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding a statute restricting casino
advertising aimed at Puerto Rican residents).
78. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 2371 (1995).
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upheld Florida's thirty day ban on written targeted contact with
accident victims after an accident or a disaster. 7 9 This was the
first time in more than fifteen years that a restriction on
professional advertising or professional solicitation was upheld
by the Supreme Court, and the swing justice was Justice
Breyer. 80 The four more conservative justices also supported the
ban. 81 The four more liberal justices opposed the ban, and

Justice Breyer sided with the conservatives and provided the fifth
vote for upholding this thirty day restriction on contacting
accident or disaster victims. 82
In a way, this is almost Chief Justice Burger's revenge, for the
late Chief Justice had long railed against the Court's decision in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 83 the first case to allow lawyer

advertising. 84 He had always insisted that lawyer advertising
would lead to ambulance chasing and unprofessionalism, and in
that regard, Justice O'Connor took up the battle and wound up
writing the Court's opinion in this first case in many years that
85
restricts advertising and solicitation by professionals.

79. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2374. The Florida Bar rules, which the
Court upheld, "create a brief 30-day blackout period after an accident during
which lawyers may not, directly or indirectly, single out accident victims or
their relatives in order to solicit their business." Id.
80. Justice Breyer joined in the opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice
O'Connor. Id. at 2373.
81. In addition to Justice Breyer, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, and Thomas also joined in the majority opinion, delivered by Justice
O'Connor. Id.
82. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. at 2381.
83. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
84. In Bates, the Court held that under the First Amendment, a state may
not restrain "the publication in a newspaper of [a lawyer's] truthful
advertisement concerning the availability and terms of routine legal services."
Id. at 384. Chief Justice Berger stated that "I fear that [allowing legal
advertising] will be injurious to those whom the ban on legal advertising was
designed to protect - the members of the general public in need of legal
services." Id. at 386 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. FRorida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2371. The Court stated that "[n]early two
decades of cases have built upon the foundation laid by Bates." Id. at 2375.
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The basis of the decision was a public opinion survey which
showed that people in Florida thought very ill of lawyers and
perceived many of them to be ambulance chasers. 86 I wonder
how much the Florida bar paid for that survey. Based on that
survey, Florida enacted a thirty day ban on certain kinds of
solicitations in order to protect the privacy of victims, and to help
counter the public perception of the bar as a lot of sharks. 87
Based on those two rationales, the Supreme Court upheld the
Florida restriction based on protecting the privacy of an accident
or disaster victim from being assaulted, if you will, by lawyers or
representatives, within thirty days of an accident. 88 In addition,
the restriction improves the baleful image of the bar that was
caused by an effort to solicit clients who might be vulnerable to
overbearing solicitation. 89 For those two reasons, the Court
sustained the ban. To reach that result, the Court had to
distinguish precedent left and right - cases which had upheld inperson solicitation by accountants, targeted written solicitation by
lawyers, public policy mailings by utility companies, and even
mailed advertisements for condoms. 90
To the argument that victims needed access to counsel as soon
as possible, Justice O'Connor suggested that a victim could
always look up a lawyer in the yellow pages. 9 1 It was precisely
on this point that the dissent, written by Justice Kennedy,
focused. 92 He stated that if you are not allowed to be told by a
lawyer that you have rights, particularly within the critical first
month after an event when evidence could be gathered and
witnesses could be interviewed, in effect, it is like having no
rights at all. 9 3 Therefore, he viewed the restriction as a violation
of the free speech rights of lawyers, the free speech rights of
their clients and potential clients to hear them out, and the rights
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.at 2377-78.
Id.at 2379.
Id.at 2381.
Id.
Id.at 2376-79.
Id.at 2380.
See id. at 2381.
Id. at 2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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of those clients to petition the courts for redress of grievances. 94
It is difficult to tell whether this decision is an overreaction to a
particularly questionable form of solicitation, or whether it is the
beginning of an attack on Bates v. State Bar of Arizona itself.
Time will tell.
V. LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORATION
The next two cases deal with a little more complex situation.
That is, whether choices about which speakers can use facilities
be subject to public control, constitutional control, statutory
control, or otherwise. Let me see if I can flesh out those concepts
by discussing two cases. I'm dealing here with the Amtrak case 95
96
and the St. Patrick's Day parade case.
In the Amtrak case, the issue was whether Amtrak, because of
its connection to the federal government, should be considered a
government actor and therefore subject to the restraints of the
First Amendment. 97 The Court analyzed this question in response
to a claim by Michael Lebron, a well-known political artist, that
Amtrak had violated the First Amendment in finding his
proposed advertisement unsuitable for display in Penn Station. 98
The billboard display contained a political attack on the Coors
brewing family and was rejected by Amtrak as "political
advertising." The Second Circuit held that Amtrak was not to be
considered a government actor or a government entity, and thus,
it was not subject to First Amendment restrictions. 99
However, the Supreme Court, in an eight to one decision
written by Justice Scalia, held otherwise. In a long opinion
surveying the history and status of government-created
94. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
95. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995).
The National Railroad Passenger Corp. is commonly referred to as Amtrak.

96. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,
115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
97. Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 964.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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corporations, Justice Scalia stated that whenever there is a public
institution, created by an act of Congress for purposes that are
important to the federal government, and the government
appoints a majority of the members of the governing board of
that corporation, then the corporation is a government entity. 10 0
This is not a question of whether Amtrak is similar to the
government. The Court stated that Amtrak is the government. It
is an agency of the federal government and, therefore, it is
subject to the protections of the First Amendment. 10 1
The Amtrak decision is interesting, and I believe that it will
have significant implications for local government. This is
because under the principle of the Amtrak case, many Amtrak
policies, such as removing homeless people from Penn Station,
or restricting people from loitering or vagrancy, will now be
subject to constitutional control. The rationale is based on the
theory that Amtrak, in its operation of Penn Station, is the
government and is therefore limited in the same way that the
government is limited.
First, municipally-controlled transportation facilities will now
become part of the municipality and be subject to the limitations
of the First and Fourth Amendment protections. 102 Second,
sports arenas where the local government appoints or is
significantly involved in the establishment of the entity that runs
the sports arena, may now become treatable as a government
agent. 103 Thus, a whole host of questions about who gets to put
up what billboard on the outdoor fence or around the arena
become First Amendment questions. Those implications are
significant.
Finally, Justice Scalia adverted to the point that to some extent
there is a movement to privatize government; to form corporate
entities out of governmental agencies. But, as Justice Scalia
noted, the Constitution will safeguard it. 10 4 One may not take
what are otherwise public functions, such as education and law
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 972.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 974.
Id. at 971.
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enforcement, turn them over to publicly responsible corporations,
and then claim that they are private. The Constitution will still
follow the government: the First Amendment will follow, the
Equal Protection Clause will follow, and the Fourth Amendment
will follow as well. 105 Thus, this is an important decision
because it will set the bearing on issues of local government as to
when the Constitution and the First Amendment will limit choices
that are made by the local government and its surrogates.
VI. HURLEY v. IRISH-AMERICAN GAY, LESBIAN AMD
BISEXUAL GROUP OFBOSTON
The Amtrak case was about whether Amtrak was a "public
agency" that had to accept unwanted speech. A similar issue was
confronted in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston,106 The question was whether a
parade, the St. Patrick's Day parade in Boston, was a "public
accommodation", and therefore a governmental agent which must
open its door to unwanted speech or speakers. 107
In the Hurley case, the Court's unanimous answer in an opinion
written by Justice David Souter was a resounding "no." 1 08
Justice Souter stated that to treat a parade like a public
accommodation, one must open its doors to groups with an
unwelcome message, that would be destructive and violative of
First Amendment rights. 109 Put another way, the government
cannot rain on, rein in, or reign over the St. Patrick's Day
parade.
The controversy happened to occur in Boston, but of course,
we have been experiencing it for a number of years in New York
as well. The controversy was whether the St. Patrick's Day
parade organizers could be restrictive in their choice of what
groups or contingents to include in their parade, particularly,
105. Id.
106. 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
107. Id. at 2347.

108. Id.
109. Id.
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whether they could exclude groups that identify themselves as
gay, lesbian, bisexual or a similar category. 110 The Supreme
Court determined that putting together groups in a parade is
similar to a decision about putting together articles in a
newspaper. 111 It is as protected by the First Amendment as is

editorial discretion. 112 A parade may be a different kind of First
Amendment medium, but it is historically and doctrinally a
recognized First Amendment medium. The government's power
to tell speakers what to say, what not to say, what points to
make, and what points not to make, is certainly restricted by the
First Amendment. 113 The opinion makes this point in a number
114
of important and powerful ways.
In addition to stating that a parade would not be a public
accommodation which could be forced open to groups in order to
enforce an antidiscrimination principle, the Court basically stated
110. In Hurley, the Court began its analysis by noting that Boston has a
long tradition, dating back to 1737, of holding a St. Patrick's Day celebration
on March 17th. Id. at 2341. In 1947, Boston ended its formal sponsorship of
the parade and "granted authority to organize and conduct [the parade] to the
petitioner South Boston Allied War Veterans Council. . .

.".

Id. In 1992, "a

number of gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of the Irish immigrants
joined together ...

to form respondent organization ...

to march in the

parade as a way to express pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian,
and bisexual individuals. . .

."

Id. After being denied permission to march in

the 1992 parade, respondent obtained a "state-court order to include its
contingent .

. . ."

Id. In 1993, respondent again brought suit alleging both

constitutional and state public accommodations law violations. Id. The Court
reversed the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in favor of
respondent and held that the "requirement to admit a parade contingent
expressing a message not of the private organizers' own choosing violates the
First Amendment" rights of the petitioner. Id. at 2343 (citation omitted).
111. Id. at 2346.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2347.
114. Id. The Court stated that outside the context of commercial
advertising, which sometimes requires "'purely factual and uncontroversial
information,' [the State] ...

may not compel affirmance of a belief with

which the speaker disagrees." Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, this right
"applies not only to expressions of value, opinions, or endorsement, but
equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid. . .

omitted).

."

Id. (citation
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that generating the right thinking about issues is something that is
a decidedly fatal objective under the First Amendment. 115 That
is, if the point of public accommodation law is not to protect
against harmful conduct but to discourage bad ideas, this is
something that under the First Amendment, government cannot
coerce. 116 Thus, the Court almost went out of its way to
comment on the political correctness issue by suggesting that the
First Amendment guards against government efforts to tell people
how they ought to think about something. Therefore, the issue
has been resolved, for the most part, of whether municipalities
have control over parades in terms of who is going to participate

in them. The answer is no. There is no constitutional warrant or
public accommodation warrant for telling parade organizers
whom to include. 117 Can you require permits? Sure. Can you

regulate the time, place and manner? Sure. But to regulate
inclusiveness, the Court said, is to regulate content, and that's

impermissible. 118

115. Id. at 2350. The Court recognized "that the ultimate point of
forbidding acts of discrimination towards certain classes is to produce a society
free of the corresponding biases." Id. However, "if this indeed is the point of
applying the state law to expressive conduct, it is a decidedly fatal objective."
Id.
116. To wit, "Itihe very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be
used to produce thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed,
all people, grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than
a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression." Id.
117. Id. at 2351. The Court, in emphasizing "the Nation's commitment to
protect freedom of speech" concluded that "[d]issaproval of a private speaker's
statement does not legitimize use of the Commonwealth's [public
accommodation law] to compel the speaker to alter the message by including
one more acceptable to others." Id.
118. Id. at 2347.
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VII. CAPITOL SQUARE REVIEW BOARD v. PINEE;
ROSENBERGER v. UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
Finally, content was also at the center of the last two cases I
want to talk about. 119 Here the content was both speech and
speech of a religious nature. The question was whether
government must permit its facilities and its resources to be used
for speech which has a religious message.120 And if the
government does permit that, does the very allowance or support
of that religious speech violate the Establishment Clause? 12 1 One
of the themes of the St. Patrick's Day Parade case was that
government does not necessarily endorse speech that it permits.
Is the same true here?
Whenever I think about this case, I think about a New England
traffic circle. The Free Speech, Free Exercise and the
Establishment Clause principles enter the intersection where they
swirl madly around and they emerge heading in a direction that
they did not know when they first entered the traffic circle. I
think that's what happened in some of these cases. Let me just
describe each one of them for you.
One involved the placing of a cross by the Ku Klux Klan on a
plaza in front of the Ohio State Capitol. 122 The other involved
subsidizing a student religious publication as part of campus life,
and in both cases, the plaintiffs claimed that the government was
violating their free speech or free exercise of religious rights by
119. Rosenberger v. Rector of University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510
(1995); Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (1995).
120. In Rosenberger, the issue was whether the University of Virginia
violated the First Amendment rights of a student group by not subsidizing the
group's religious publication as a part of campus life. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct.
at 2513. In Capitol Square, the issue was whether the government violated the
First Amendment rights of the Ku Klux Klan by not permitting them to place a
religious symbol, a Latin cross, on a plaza in front of the Ohio State Capitol.
Capitol Square Review Board, 115 S.Ct. at 2444-45.
121. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2521 (stating that certiorari was granted to
answer the Establishment Clause question); Capitol Square Review Board, 115
S. Ct. at 2444-45 (stating that the Establishment Clause issue "is the sole
question before us to decide").
122. Capitol Square Review Board, 115 S.Ct. at 2445.
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refusing them access. 12 3 The government insisted that its refusal

was compelled by the need to avoid violating the Establishment
Clause by granting access. 12 4 In both cases, the Court upheld the
speaker and ruled that the permitting of religious speech or

religious symbolism did not entail violating the Establishment
Clause. 125
A. The Klan Cross Case
Now the Klan cross case. 12 6 Capitol Square is a ten-acre site
owned by the state and which surrounds the state capitol building

in Columbus, Ohio. 127 It has long been used as a public forum
for a variety of speakers and groups. 12 8 After the placement of
an unattended Christmas tree and an unattended menorah was

approved by the park board, the Ku Klux Klan, not surprisingly,
asked to put up a cross in the plaza. 12 9 The park board said no,
and two lower federal courts said yes. 13 0 The Supreme Court

agreed with those courts; however, there was sharp disagreement
about the appropriate rationale. 131
123. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
124. Id. at 2520-21. Although the Establishment Clause issue was "no
longer presse[d]" by the University on its brief on the merits, the Court stated
that "it must be addressed." Id; Capitol Square Review Board, 115 S. Ct. at
2446. Petitioners alleged that their sole ground for refusal of the display of the
cross is "the State's interest in avoiding official endorsement of Christianity, as
required by the Establishment Clause." Id.
125. Id. at 2524. The Rosenberger Court held that "[tlo obey the
Establishment Clause, it was not necessary for the University to deny
eligibility [for funding] to student publications because of their [religious]
viewpoint." Id; Capitol Square Review Board, 115 S. Ct. at 2450. The Capitol
Square Court held that "[r]eligious expression cannot violate the Establishment
Clause where it ...occurs in a traditional or designated public forum,
publicly announced and open to all on equal terms." Id.
126. CapitolSquare Review Board, 115 S. Ct. at 2440.
127. Id. at 2444.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2445.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2450 (discussing the procedural posture in the lower courts). The
judgment of the Court and an opinion with respect to three of its four parts was
delivered by Justice Scalia. Id. at 2444
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Justice Scalia spoke for a majority in holding that a public
forum cannot exclude religious speech or speakers based on
content and that granting permission to use a public forum does
not necessarily constitute a sponsorship of the religious
message. 132 But he only spoke for a plurality in further holding
that the rule was no different, just because some observers might
reasonably perceive that the government was endorsing the
message embodied in the cross. 13 3 Here, Justice Scalia's opinion
took a categorical approach. Any use of a public forum by
private groups with a religious message will not constitute a
violation of the Establishment Clause.134 In effect, he would
have created a public forum exception to the Establishment
Clause. When government makes available a public forum to all
comers, to all people, all sizes and shapes, the fact that religious
groups use that place as well, he said, can never constitute a
violation of the Establishment Clause. 135
The opinion of Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Breyer and
Souter, the three other justices who made up the seven-Justice
majority, took a much more contextual, fact-based, nuanced
approach. To them, the question was whether a reasonable
observer would perceive the government endorsing religion by
permitting the religious display? 136 Would a reasonable observer
feel the placement of this cross, in its proximity to the state
capitol, was an official endorsement of the religious message that
the cross embodied? The majority felt that in this case, the
answer was no. 13 7 The reasonable observer, knowing anything at
all about the history of that place and the function of it as a
public forum, would not find that the government was supporting
132. Id. at 2447.
133. Id. at 2447-50.
134. Id. at 2450.
135. Id. at 2449.
136. Id. at 2456 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
137. Id. at 2448 ("Surely some [members of the community,] hearing of

religious ceremonies on [state] premises, and not knowing of the premises'
availability and use for all sorts of other private activities, might leap to the
erroneous conclusion of state endorsement.").
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the message, but rather that the government was neutrally
providing a public forum to all messages, religious as well. 138
Seven justices together formed the majority, four for the Scalia
flat rule public forum exception to the Establishment Clause,
three for the more fact-based contextual approach. 139 The two
dissenters, Justices Stevens and Justice Ginsburg, felt that the
facts here made it so clear that unattended crosses on public
property would convey the impermissible message that the public
was endorsing the religious view embodied in that cross and,
therefore, a violation of the Establishment Clause was clearly
shown. 140 But the majority said no, the government does not
adopt what it allows. 14 1 It does not prescribe what it permits, and
neutrality towards religious does not constitute endorsement of
religion.142
B. The School Paper Case
This same principle persuaded the majority of justices in the

college newspaper funding case, Rosenberger v. Rector of the
University of Virginia.143 The Justices felt that the same
138. Id. at 2456 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
139. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined
Justice Scalia in the fourth part of the opinion discussing the "public forum

exception." Id. at 2444, 2447. Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer did not
join in the fourth part of the opinion. Id. at 2451 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
140. Justice Stevens' dissent stated that "[s]ome might have well perceived
the [the cross] as a message of love, others as a message of hate, still others as
a message of exclusion - a Statehouse sign calling powerfully to mind their
outsider status." Id. at 2465. Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, stated that the
Klan's disclaimer "appended to the foot of the cross was unsturdy: it did not
identify the Klan as a sponsor; it failed to state unequivocally that Ohio did not
endorse the display's message; and it was not shown to be legible from a
distance." Id. at 2475 (footnote omitted).
141. Id. at 2447 ("'[A]n open air forum... does not confer any
imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices.'") (citation
omitted).
142. Id. at 2446-47.
143. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
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principles were applicable when the government provides either a
public forum or public funding for a religious speech. 144 In
Rosenberger, an interesting irony existed. That is, the University
of Virginia was created by Thomas Jefferson, one of the framers
of the Constitution who was most concerned with the separation
of church and state. Due to this relationship, the opinions in the
Court contained much quoting and counterquoting of Jefferson's
and James Madison's views regarding this comparable issue. The
Court, via a sharply divided five to four vote, stated that the
same principles of equal access which were applied with the cross
in the plaza case, applied equally to the issue of school
funding. 145
The Court held that providing students with equal access for
religious speech does not constitute impermissible endorsement
or sponsorship of that speech. 146 This case was one where the
division of the court seemed to be sharpest on the
conservative/liberal spectrum. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas and O'Connor each supported the
religious student speakers. 147 Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg
and Breyer each dissented and saw an impermissible support for
religion. 148
Despite the sharp division, the majority stated that this was an
easy case. The Court had previously established that schools and
colleges had to make facilities available for religious groups on
an evenhanded basis, and that such a Free Speech requirement
does not violate the Establishment Clause. 149 Thus, in Widmar v.
Vincent, 150 the Court held that if meeting rooms are made
144. Id. at 2522.

145. Id. at 2523. The Court stated that, "[i]n this case, 'the government has
not willfully fostered or encouraged' any mistaken impression that the student
newspapers speak for the University." Id. (quoting Capitol Square Review
Board v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2448 (1995)).
146. Id. (stating that "[ilt does not violate the Establishment Clause for a
public university to grant access to its facilities on a religion-neutral basis...
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 2513.
Id. at 2533.
Id. at 2523. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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available to student groups on a college campus, a student
religious group cannot be excluded from also using the rooms. 15 1
In another case, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School
District,152 the Court held that if a high school makes rooms
available after school to community groups on a first-come, firstserve basis, they can not specifically exclude a community group
because they are of a religious nature. 153 Based on this
precedent, the majority of the Court found that the same principle
of equal access to facilities should also apply to funds collected
54
for student activities as well. 1
In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia collected a student
activity fee of fourteen dollars per semester from all students,
and then used that money to subsidize a wide range of student
activities. 155 The Court held that the school cannot,
constitutionally, deny access to the fund to subsidize those
activities which promote a religious point of view. 156 Thus, in
Rosenberger, the issue was whether a religiously-oriented student
newspaper could seek and receive funds out of the student
activity fund. 157 The majority's decision was based on the same
two points that have been swirling around that traffic circle:
First, it would violate the Free Speech Clause to prohibit access
to those funds because of the viewpoint of the student group. 158
Second, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit access to
those funds even if the viewpoint of the student group happens to
be religious, provided that the funds are made available to all
student groups that meet certain neutral criteria. 159 Therefore,
student groups whose viewpoint or message is of a religious
nature, or from a religious source, cannot be excluded. 160 The
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
Id.
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518-19.

155. Id. at 2514.

156. Id. at 2520.
157. Id. at 2521.
158. Id. at 2517.

159. Id. at 2523.
160. Id. at 2525.
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majority stated that to find otherwise would put the government
in the wrong business of examining each point of view to
determine whether it was religious or secular, and admitting the
secular views but excluding the religious. 16 1 The Court stated
that the better approach would be the evenhanded subsidy of all
student groups and activities which meet otherwise neutral
criteria.162 Therefore, by a five to four vote, the Court
concluded, as it had with the cross in the plaza case, that both the
Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses require and the
Establishment Clause does not prohibit the availability of these
facilities and these funds for religious speakers. 163
I think it is clear that both of these cases significantly open the
door to a greater accommodation of private religious speech in
the public marketplace of ideas. Furthermore, this seems to
square with the current mood of the country. Ironically,
however, the Court's slight easing of restrictions on publicly
subsidized religious activity may dampen the ardor of those who
seek to achieve that type of result via constitutional amendment.
We will have to wait for the future to see how these principles
play out.
For example, one issue is whether you can have a religious
speaker at a high school graduation event where the students, not
the school officials, have chosen that speaker. Two years ago, the
Court, in Lee v. Weisman, 164 stated that a violation of the
Establishment occurred when a school chooses a religious person
to participate in a high school graduation and scripts the
sermon. 165 Since then, many high schools, particularly in the
South, have tried to circumvent this decision by allowing the
161. Id. at 2524.
162. Id. at 2523.
163. Id. at 2525.

164. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).

165. Id. at 599. The Court considered the question of "whether a religious
exercise may be conducted at a graduation ceremony ... where ...young
graduates who object are induced to conform." Id. The Court held that it
would be violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment for a
school to "persuade or compel a student to participate in a religious exercise."

Id.
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students to decide whether to have a religious speaker of their
choosing and the only role the school has is to provide the
microphone. Is this a violation of the Establishment Clause?
When the Court gets to this particular issue, we will have to see
how it gets resolved in light of the two cases we have just
discussed.
To conclude, there is one final important case that was not
decided on First Amendment grounds, or not explicitly decided
on First Amendment grounds. I'm thinking of U.S. Term Limits
Inc. v. Thornton, 166 where the Supreme Court decision
invalidated state-enacted term limits on congressional offices. 167
Although the Court invalidated those restrictions on separation of
powers grounds, the Court might have decided the case on
Diogenes' theory as well: Get out of the people's light. If voters
want to return representatives to Washington time after time, the
job of the government is to get out of the way and let the voters
decide. Thank you.

166. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995). This case involved a challenge to an
amendment to the Arkansas State Constitution limiting potential candidates for
election to Congress to those people who have served less than "three terms in
the House of Representative or two terms in the Senate." Id. at 1845. The
Court ruled that this amendment violated the "fundamental principle of our
representative democracy," and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. (citation
omitted).
167. Id.

